Thanks for 10% suggestion. Thats a worse tooth to tail ratio than I expected. Interested in why you think NG and reserve will be where to find recruits? I have a hunch but would prefer it unfiltered. Want to discuss MOSs too? I have a hunch on that score as well :)
The 10% is based on a rough estimate of what I perceived during my deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The reality is that most deployers rarely (if ever) go outside the wire. Even of that 10%, I would say only a fraction of those dealt with anything resembling counterinsurgency warfare. Of course, there are exceptions to this, as some infantry BCTs saw disproportionately more combat than others. Other factors include whether we're talking OIF or OEF vets, and when they deployed. Not all experiences will be the same. Of note, I am not rolling SOF into this analysis, as that merits a different (and quite extensive) discussion.
All that said, to get to your first question, my focus on the NG and Reserves is based on my observation and experience with all three COMPOs over my career. While I'm sure you'll find active duty sympathizers, I don't get the sense that any meaningful number would actually cross the line, abandoning their units and taking up arms against their own country. This is because AD soldiers are part of the professional force, and are way more likely to understand that they would be betraying their oaths and their comrades.
On the flip side, the Reserves and NG are not professional soldiers. This has nothing to do with technical and tactical competence. I, myself, have served with and deployed as a member of the NG. Rather, this has more to do with accountability, culture, and (to varying degrees) loyalties. Keep in mind that the reserve compos are not military full-timers, such that their personal and professional relationships are developed within their communities outside of a military setting. Since AD military traditionally emphasizes an apolitical posture, you can infer that the part-timers will be influenced to a much greater degree (for better or worse) by the political landscape than their comparatively insulated AD counterparts. This is to say that Reserve and NG are much more susceptible to radicalization than AD.
If I were to be a little more precise, I would say that the NG is more viable recruiting pool than the Reserves. I could write a lengthy thesis on this point, but for brevity, I'd point out that the loyalties of the NG do not inherently lie with the US Constitution. I know I would take some major HEAT rounds for saying something like that around my peers, but this is rooted in the founding of the country and its history with militias. The National Defense Act of 1916 and "Total Army" policy notwithstanding, the idea that the NG is "National" is delusional. The NG will always be a tool of the respective States to which they belong, as it is hardwired to prioritize the State over the Federal Government. What this means is that the National Guard in Republican dominated states (particularly if the TAG, ATAG, or state Military Department leadership are sympathetic) will likely form a viable nucleus for a separatist militia. If this sounds far-fetched, keep in mind that DeSantis is already toying around with this idea in Florida, and Texas and South Dakota have already experimented with having wealth private donors fund border deployments. It is not unreasonable to imagine a scenario where a tech billionaire starts funding a separatist movement in exchange for the ability to operate in an autonomous (read: tax-free) zone inside a break-away state. But I digress. This is all to say that, at the organizational culture level of analysis, the NG and Reserves are the most primed to support an insurrection. On the individual level, as I alluded to earlier, I could spend hours discussing the many similar personality traits and psychological profiles that the J6 attackers share with many Guardsmen and militarized police officers. Perhaps in another thread or Twitter Space, I could expand on some of these ideas. Again, they are extremely uncomfortable topics , but these are pretty desperate times.
In regards to the MOSs, this is pretty closely tied with the paragraph above. I think it's safe to say that SOF will always present the greatest domestic terror threat (though not the greatest civil war threat). Although it may seem counterintuitive, I think most of your recruits out of the reserve components will not be from combat arms. Also something not discussed here is the breakdown by Service (my opinion is that the Air Force is a much more willing recruiting pool than the ARNG or USAR). Again, there's a lot that goes into that opinion, for which there just isn't enough space to address here.
Ryan, this is exceptionally useful, thank you for taking the time and making the effort. What you have laid out makes a lot of sense and seems reasonable. It also raises a lot of questions [outside of the scope of this discussion I am fasciated by the tooth to tail issue... if only 10% got outside and of those even fewer did coin ops - as opposed to blowing stuff up (I assume is the alternative?) - it really makes you wonder about the effectiveness of the force as constituted. I run another sub stack on the future of war with China and am deep on the Marines FD2030 debate. Thats where this issue interests me in the sense of 'doing more with less' or using a smaller footprint/ow observable force to max ops effect. Granted FD2030 ops will be 180 out from coin but from a force delivery and sustainment viewpoint this raises a lot of interesting questions - to me at least].
I fully understand and accept what you have said that differentiates the Guard and Reserves from AD. That makes a lot of sense - particularly from the cultural perspective - state based, part time, less connected to the constitution in the way its drilled into AD forces. I wonder if Guard/Res focus is reflected in the arrests and indictments from J6. If I recall correctly the FBI shooter from last week was a reserve/guard guy.
My hunch on MOSs was MPs... this was based on those involved in Abu Ghraib who seemed not to grasp that anything was wrong with what they were doing. I note also, to your point, that the bulk of them were not AD.
I think your point about state GOP govts trying to essentially drive a wedge between their guard/res and the Pentagon is well made. It seemed to start with covid vax and escalate from there. That concerns me WRT overall force cohesion and the trend among these states to talk up succession etc.. That may be talk and propaganda but sometimes these things can transition to the real world. One thing is for sure it adds to the sense of division and the break down of norms of national cohesion - generally and in uniform.
I will ask Dakota Adams what he thinks about this discussion. His dad is Stewart Rhodes the OK head. Dakota spent a lot of time inside these groups. From memory - I seem to recall his mentioning res/guard more than AD. Will check with him.
If this all works out that should have implications for how the Pentagon attempts to manage extremism as well as insights into how AD forces might react to a serious societal breakdown/intensification of paramilitary ops.
Again, thank you for this feed back, its exactly the kind of interaction I had hoped my substacks would create.
A rough estimate you could use is that about 10% of deployed forces actually go outside the wire regularly to conduct operations (presence patrols, engagements, or combat ops). Something to keep in mind, too, is that that number includes repeat deployers. Those combat vets will likely be vastly more opposed than supportive of any fascist I surgery or civil war. The military demographic that will comprise the lion's share of any right-wing forces are going to come from the National Guard and Reservists and those vets who did 2-4 years and got out. The more senior vets that choose to join the fascist army will obviously form its initial cadre of leadership.
Thanks for 10% suggestion. Thats a worse tooth to tail ratio than I expected. Interested in why you think NG and reserve will be where to find recruits? I have a hunch but would prefer it unfiltered. Want to discuss MOSs too? I have a hunch on that score as well :)
The 10% is based on a rough estimate of what I perceived during my deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The reality is that most deployers rarely (if ever) go outside the wire. Even of that 10%, I would say only a fraction of those dealt with anything resembling counterinsurgency warfare. Of course, there are exceptions to this, as some infantry BCTs saw disproportionately more combat than others. Other factors include whether we're talking OIF or OEF vets, and when they deployed. Not all experiences will be the same. Of note, I am not rolling SOF into this analysis, as that merits a different (and quite extensive) discussion.
All that said, to get to your first question, my focus on the NG and Reserves is based on my observation and experience with all three COMPOs over my career. While I'm sure you'll find active duty sympathizers, I don't get the sense that any meaningful number would actually cross the line, abandoning their units and taking up arms against their own country. This is because AD soldiers are part of the professional force, and are way more likely to understand that they would be betraying their oaths and their comrades.
On the flip side, the Reserves and NG are not professional soldiers. This has nothing to do with technical and tactical competence. I, myself, have served with and deployed as a member of the NG. Rather, this has more to do with accountability, culture, and (to varying degrees) loyalties. Keep in mind that the reserve compos are not military full-timers, such that their personal and professional relationships are developed within their communities outside of a military setting. Since AD military traditionally emphasizes an apolitical posture, you can infer that the part-timers will be influenced to a much greater degree (for better or worse) by the political landscape than their comparatively insulated AD counterparts. This is to say that Reserve and NG are much more susceptible to radicalization than AD.
If I were to be a little more precise, I would say that the NG is more viable recruiting pool than the Reserves. I could write a lengthy thesis on this point, but for brevity, I'd point out that the loyalties of the NG do not inherently lie with the US Constitution. I know I would take some major HEAT rounds for saying something like that around my peers, but this is rooted in the founding of the country and its history with militias. The National Defense Act of 1916 and "Total Army" policy notwithstanding, the idea that the NG is "National" is delusional. The NG will always be a tool of the respective States to which they belong, as it is hardwired to prioritize the State over the Federal Government. What this means is that the National Guard in Republican dominated states (particularly if the TAG, ATAG, or state Military Department leadership are sympathetic) will likely form a viable nucleus for a separatist militia. If this sounds far-fetched, keep in mind that DeSantis is already toying around with this idea in Florida, and Texas and South Dakota have already experimented with having wealth private donors fund border deployments. It is not unreasonable to imagine a scenario where a tech billionaire starts funding a separatist movement in exchange for the ability to operate in an autonomous (read: tax-free) zone inside a break-away state. But I digress. This is all to say that, at the organizational culture level of analysis, the NG and Reserves are the most primed to support an insurrection. On the individual level, as I alluded to earlier, I could spend hours discussing the many similar personality traits and psychological profiles that the J6 attackers share with many Guardsmen and militarized police officers. Perhaps in another thread or Twitter Space, I could expand on some of these ideas. Again, they are extremely uncomfortable topics , but these are pretty desperate times.
In regards to the MOSs, this is pretty closely tied with the paragraph above. I think it's safe to say that SOF will always present the greatest domestic terror threat (though not the greatest civil war threat). Although it may seem counterintuitive, I think most of your recruits out of the reserve components will not be from combat arms. Also something not discussed here is the breakdown by Service (my opinion is that the Air Force is a much more willing recruiting pool than the ARNG or USAR). Again, there's a lot that goes into that opinion, for which there just isn't enough space to address here.
Hope this at least sparks some discussion.
- Ryan
Ryan, this is exceptionally useful, thank you for taking the time and making the effort. What you have laid out makes a lot of sense and seems reasonable. It also raises a lot of questions [outside of the scope of this discussion I am fasciated by the tooth to tail issue... if only 10% got outside and of those even fewer did coin ops - as opposed to blowing stuff up (I assume is the alternative?) - it really makes you wonder about the effectiveness of the force as constituted. I run another sub stack on the future of war with China and am deep on the Marines FD2030 debate. Thats where this issue interests me in the sense of 'doing more with less' or using a smaller footprint/ow observable force to max ops effect. Granted FD2030 ops will be 180 out from coin but from a force delivery and sustainment viewpoint this raises a lot of interesting questions - to me at least].
I fully understand and accept what you have said that differentiates the Guard and Reserves from AD. That makes a lot of sense - particularly from the cultural perspective - state based, part time, less connected to the constitution in the way its drilled into AD forces. I wonder if Guard/Res focus is reflected in the arrests and indictments from J6. If I recall correctly the FBI shooter from last week was a reserve/guard guy.
My hunch on MOSs was MPs... this was based on those involved in Abu Ghraib who seemed not to grasp that anything was wrong with what they were doing. I note also, to your point, that the bulk of them were not AD.
I think your point about state GOP govts trying to essentially drive a wedge between their guard/res and the Pentagon is well made. It seemed to start with covid vax and escalate from there. That concerns me WRT overall force cohesion and the trend among these states to talk up succession etc.. That may be talk and propaganda but sometimes these things can transition to the real world. One thing is for sure it adds to the sense of division and the break down of norms of national cohesion - generally and in uniform.
I will ask Dakota Adams what he thinks about this discussion. His dad is Stewart Rhodes the OK head. Dakota spent a lot of time inside these groups. From memory - I seem to recall his mentioning res/guard more than AD. Will check with him.
If this all works out that should have implications for how the Pentagon attempts to manage extremism as well as insights into how AD forces might react to a serious societal breakdown/intensification of paramilitary ops.
Again, thank you for this feed back, its exactly the kind of interaction I had hoped my substacks would create.
VR
Adam
A rough estimate you could use is that about 10% of deployed forces actually go outside the wire regularly to conduct operations (presence patrols, engagements, or combat ops). Something to keep in mind, too, is that that number includes repeat deployers. Those combat vets will likely be vastly more opposed than supportive of any fascist I surgery or civil war. The military demographic that will comprise the lion's share of any right-wing forces are going to come from the National Guard and Reservists and those vets who did 2-4 years and got out. The more senior vets that choose to join the fascist army will obviously form its initial cadre of leadership.